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How should we assess the performance of political leaders?  As many scholars 
note, it is important to take into account the structural context that politicians 
govern within when appraising their record in office. However, many existing 
approaches used to assess political leaders have not integrated a notion of 
structure into their research in an explicit or detailed way. This paper tries to 
respond to this gap by first discussing a range of issues involved in undertaking 
such an exercise. It highlights not only the significance of incorporating 
structure, but structural change into leadership studies. The paper goes on to 
develop a theoretical account of structural change utilising philosophical 
realism, before briefly applying it to the case of Gordon Brown’s tenure during 
the global financial crisis. It concludes by suggesting that, understood through 
the lens of philosophical realism, the crisis posed a particularly difficult and 
challenging set of circumstances for Brown and his response to them should be 
given more credit than it has so far received.  
 
Keywords: Gordon Brown, political leadership, political leaders, prime 
ministers, statecraft. 
 
This is a pre-print of an article was published as: 
 
 Jim Buller and Toby S. James (2015) ‘Integrating Structural Context into 
the Assessment of Political Leadership: Realism, Gordon Brown and 
the Great Financial Crisis‘, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1), 77-96, available 
from http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/68/1/77.   
  
  2 
A new wave of scholarship in leadership studies has sought to establish 
common frameworks and methodologies for evaluating prime ministers. The 
art of assessing political leaders has  been dismissed as ‘underdeveloped’ and 
akin to a ‘parlor game’ with little intellectual merit (Strangio, t'Hart, & Walter, 
2013).  However, democratic theory argues that elections are the main 
recruitment tool for citizens in selecting their leaders so it is important that 
scholarly endeavour considers how successful leaders are at meeting their 
objectives.  Moreover, we should also be sensitive to the possibility that the 
objectives of office-seeking politicians will not always coincide with the 
interests of their citizens.  Understanding how statesmen and women gain and 
maintain power, as well as the difficulties involved in doing so, is an important 
element of leadership evaluation.   
 
This article builds on our earlier assessment of the Blair premiership by 
attempting to integrate a notion of structural context into a judgment of 
political leaders in a more explicit way. Carrying out such a task poses a 
number of questions. Can we make statements concerning whether some 
structural contexts are ‘easier’ or more ‘difficult’ to operate in? Doing so implies 
that structures have an ‘objective’ quality allowing them to be compared, but is 
this inference plausible? At the same time, structural contexts will not be static: 
they will change and become easier or more difficult for political leaders over 
time. However, comprehending structural change is one of the most formidable 
problems facing social scientists, especially when we remember that politicians 
will also attempt to construct our perceptions of ‘change’.  
 
The discussion in this article proceeds in the following way. The first part 
reviews a range of approaches that have been used to assess British leaders to 
date and reflects further on why this literature has failed so far to integrate a 
notion of structural context more directly into its work. The next section of the 
article provides an account of structural change, using the theory of 
philosophical realism. The article then applies this account of structural change 
to the global financial crisis and asserts that, understood through this 
theoretical framework, these events posed a particularly difficult challenge to 
the Brown leadership. The article concludes with a brief assessment of how 
Brown and his colleagues dealt with this demanding structural terrain.  
 
 
1.  Existing Approaches to Assessing Prime Ministers 
 
Four approaches are commonly used to assess political leaders. All of these 
perspectives provide enriching insights into the successes and failures of these 
public figures. That said, while individual politicians are the principal focus of 
analysis in this literature, how these agents relate to their structural 
environment remains less clear in this work. The importance of integrating 
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structure into the study of individuals, groups and classes has been repeatedly 
emphasised by a long tradition of social science research (see below).  Yet this 
broader theoretical debate has so far failed to penetrate the subject area of 
leadership studies in any systematic way.  
 
Take for example, the work of Fred I. Greenstein on the American Presidency.  
Greenstein (2000) established six core characteristics against which presidents 
ought to be evaluated.  These are: proficiency as public communicator; 
organisational capacity; political skill; public policy vision; cognitive style, and 
emotional intelligence (see also Theakston, 2011). While all of these 
characteristics clearly relate to a president’s agential powers, the role that 
structural context might play in this framework is less obvious. Different 
structural contexts are almost certainly going to affect the ability of a president 
to carry out these functions, so it seems only fair we take them into account. 
Greenstein has subsequently reflected upon the importance of structural 
context in some unpublished working papers and personal correspondence 
(Theakston, 2011: 81-82).   However, he is yet to elaborate further on this issue 
and provide any conceptual practical-analytical vocabulary capable of 
incorporating structure explicitly into his criteria.  
 
A second approach has been to use expert surveys.  Expert surveys were first 
popularised in the US by the seminal work of Arthur Schlesinger Sr. (1948).  
However, the approach has now been used in many democracies (see, for 
example: Azzi & Hillmer, 2013; Strangio, 2013; Theakston & Gill, 2006). As its 
label suggests, researchers ask a sample of key experts (usually historians and 
political scientists) to evaluate political leaders using their own criteria. Their 
views are then recorded, aggregated, leading to an overall judgment or ‘score’ 
for each prime minister or president in question. US based studies have 
asserted that this method is capable of incorporating structure into the 
assessment of leaders. Nichols (2012) has argued that experts praise or criticise 
presidents depending on their ability to take advantage of the challenges and 
opportunities presented to them. However, left to their own devices, experts 
are likely to make these judgements with a variety of different interpretations 
of structural context in mind, making it unclear whether such an approach can 
generate any meaningful comparisons.     
 
Historians have also attempted to assess political leaders. Typically this 
involves a balance sheet approach in which a leaders’ achievements in office 
are weighed up against their failures. Factors that are often considered include: 
the trajectory of the economy under their rule; relations with backbenchers and 
the party in the country; and the management of foreign affairs. Historians can 
be sensitive to the importance of context when judging different leaders over 
time. For example, Anthony Seldon has asserted that presiding over a 
struggling economy and a party split down the middle on the issue of Europe, 
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John Major was faced with a set of circumstances that ‘were profoundly 
adverse’ (Seldon & Lodge, 2010). Similarly, Seldon’s work on Blair and Brown 
has demonstrated an appreciation that the former governed in an environment 
which was more benign than the latter (Seldon, 2004; Seldon and Lodge, 2010; 
see also Hennessy, 2000: 542-43). That said, even when such factors are 
discussed, they are done so in the absence of any reference to the broader social 
science literature on structure and agency. This literature has identified some 
more fundamental ontological and epistemological issues which, if 
incorporated into this empirical work, would give it a stronger theoretical 
foundation.   
 
Finally, we have suggested that the statecraft approach associated with the 
work of Jim Bulpitt can also be utilized to assess British political leaders (Buller 
and James, 2012). Statecraft evaluates leaders first and foremost in terms of how 
many elections they win, but consideration is also given to how well four 
supporting functions are carried out. These are: (1) the establishment and 
conservation of an image of governing competence, particular in relation to 
issues of most concern to the electorate; (2) successful management of the party, 
so that a semblance of unity and coherence is maintained; (3) victory in the 
battle for ‘political argument hegemony’, by convincing the public that the 
party has the most credible ideas for resolving the problems facing the country; 
(4) a winning electoral strategy (Bulpitt, 1986). We have argued that this criteria 
is important for judging political leaders because winning elections is 
ultimately what politicians are in business for (see also Buller 2013; James, 2012; 
2014).  
 
Towards the end of his career, Bulpitt became more interested with integrating 
a notion of structure into his assessment of whether party leaders were 
performing these statecraft functions. In particular, Bulpitt advanced the 
proposition that the structural context facing leaders will grind out a ‘natural 
rate of governability’ (NRG) that will make their life easier or more difficult. 
Put a different way, the relative autonomy that leaders will have to pursue their 
interests is related to, ‘…the degree to which they can choose which aspects of 
the NRG they will prioritise…’ (Bulpitt, 1996: 1096). The less choice, the more 
their behaviour will be constrained. One problem with this discussion is the 
term NRG remains ambiguous. How does it differ from the related concept of 
‘structure’? Indeed, why do we need the NRG at all? Bulpitt argues that the 
concept of structure is too abstract and, as a result, it is difficult to link it to 
‘agency’ in a way that is helpful for empirical research. The NRG is supposed 
to help in this context: it is a concept that links structure to the behaviour of 
individuals and groups operating within their environment. But why should 
the NRG be any easier to define? Bulpitt provides no answer to this question 
and, because of this, the case for this additional variable is not proven.  
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It should also be noted that, while all the above approaches accept the need to 
incorporate structure into the evaluation of political leaders, they gloss over the 
awkward fact that structures can change. The context facing politicians will 
vary over time, and our assessment of them should also try to take account of 
this dynamism. For example, we might hypothesise that it will be easier for a 
political leader to achieve his or her objectives if s/he is faced with a structural 
context that is stable and predictable. Such stability should help leaders to 
clarify the precise contours of their environment, allowing them to better 
exploit the rules of the game for his/her advantage. Conversely, a structural 
context that transforms suddenly and unexpectedly can be expected to be more 
challenging. With all or most of the ‘markers’ or features of a familiar structural 
landscape washed away, leadership in such circumstances will be uncertain 
and prone to mistakes. Mistakes, in turn, may impact adversely on a leaders’ 
reputation and, ultimately, his or her political position.   
 
 
2. Incorporating Structure into Leadership Assessment: Some Problems 
of Analysis.  
 
It might be worth reflecting for a moment why it is that more progress has not 
been made injecting an awareness of structural context into leadership studies. 
To state that some structural environments are easier or more difficult to 
govern in implies that we can imbue these environments with an objective, 
material quality that can be meaningfully compared across time and space. Yet, 
intuitively, much of what we know about the way leaders interact with political 
institutions conflicts with this assumption. Politicians may find themselves 
constrained by the circumstances they operate in, but they will not always 
‘accept’ these circumstances, especially if it is not in their interests to do so. 
They will try to discursively construct the electorate’s understanding of these 
circumstances in such a way as to make them look good (or better) and their 
opponents worse. If we accept this statement, it would appear to at least 
partially undermine the notion of objectivity that would seem necessary to our 
conception of structural context if we are to use it to assess different leaders. At 
the very least, leadership studies needs to try and make a distinction between 
the ‘real’ or material properties of structures and the stories that political 
leaders want to tell about them. For the purposes of empirical research, this will 
be a difficult task to undertake.  
 
These observations correspond to what we know more generally about the 
structure-agency issue in the social sciences. Should researchers give 
precedence to actors or structures when it comes to accounting for social and 
political phenomena? After a keen and protracted debate, academics have 
‘settled’ on the position that it should be both. Agents are potentially purposive 
entities whose ideas and behaviour can reproduce and transform the society in 
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which they live. At the same time, society is made up of institutions that 
constrain the interactions between actors. To put this point differently, both 
actors and structures are necessarily interdependent entities, exhibiting a 
relationship of ‘duality’ (on the structure-agency debate, see Hay, 2002: pp. 89-
134; McAnulla, 2002). It follows then that in particular spatial and temporal 
moments, political leaders and the environment they operate in will be co-
constituted. But such a statement makes the task of judging whether one 
structural context is more challenging than another even trickier. It begs a 
preliminary question: to what extent is the leader under investigation actual 
responsible for the structural context that is also being researched empirically?   
 
Even if we accept that structures have a real and material quality, allowing us 
to say that some contexts are more challenging than others, can we say much 
more for the purposes of assessing political leaders? Put a different way, it may 
be possible to make qualitative judgments asserting that some contexts are more 
difficult to govern in, but it seems implausible that we might be able to arrive 
at quantitative evaluations concerning how much more arduous one context is 
compared with another. For example, were the circumstances facing the Heath 
government twice as demanding as those facing the Churchill government in 
the 1950s? Was the environment facing Blair three times as easy as that facing 
Attlee? Instinctively, these questions seem like the wrong ones to ask. 
Structural contexts are complex and nuanced: trying to place some kind of 
numerical value or grade on them maybe so crude and arbitrary as to be 
unhelpful. But if we cannot rank structural contexts in this way, then decisions 
about how much to ‘compensate’ leaders governing in difficult contexts when 
we judge them, would appear to be nigh on impossible. If this is the case, one 
wonders what the added intellectual value of the whole exercise might be. We 
have already noted that bringing a notion of structural context into our 
assessment of political leaders is not without significant problems. Is it really 
‘worth the candle’? 
 
These are difficult questions to answer, but a three-fold response to these 
objections can be marshalled. It is of course undeniable that the impact of the 
material is mediated by ideas and narratives (held by agents) about these 
material properties. Yet, such discourses are only likely to become influential if 
they clearly resonate with the direct experiences of individuals who are 
subjected to them. As Hay (1999) has convincingly argued, the 
‘Ungovernability’ thesis became a particularly influential interpretation of 
societal group (especially union) power in 1970s Britain because it simplified 
and distorted certain trends. Yet this interpretation would have enjoyed much 
less credibility had there been no strikes or violence at this time. Put a different 
way, it may be concept-dependent, but we can conceive of a world that is ‘out 
there’ and independent of our knowledge.  
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If this point is accepted, the notion of integrating structural context into 
leadership assessment in a way that allows for meaningful comparisons across 
time and space may not be a lost cause. We might begin by asserting that a 
structural context will be more or less challenging depending on how 
commensurate it is with the objectives of the political leaders under study. A 
structural context that compliments the ideas and preferences of those 
presidents/prime ministers being investigated can be said to be more 
favourable than one that frustrates or undermines them. Bearing in mind our 
interest in developing the statecraft approach, in this article we will define the 
objectives of political leaders as winning elections through the achievement of 
a reputation for governing competence. But it is worth noting right from the off 
that conceptualising leadership objectives in this way is contentious. For many 
British political scientists, leadership is at least partly about the pursuit of 
beliefs or values, especially those that pervade the ideological tradition of the 
party that they head. Indeed, scholars adopting such a stance have been 
persistently critical of the Labour party’s record in office, especially its failure 
to implement a more left-of-centre policy programme. This criticism has 
extended more recently to Gordon Brown’s handling of the ‘Great Financial 
Crisis’ , the subject of our case study below (see for example Coates, 2008; Shaw, 
2012).  
 
We can go further and suggest that a structural context which changes, 
especially one that alters suddenly and in a way that adversely impacts on the 
objectives of the political leader under investigation, may be more testing than 
one that remains broadly stable. An assessment of Gordon Brown’s leadership 
will obviously allow us to investigate this hypothesis further but additional 
questions flow from this proposition. If it is true (as we suggest above) that 
agents and structures are interdependent or mutually constituted, to what 
extent can Brown be held responsible for the financial crisis that impacted on 
British political economy after 2007? As author of the regulatory system which 
largely failed to spot the unfolding crisis as it hit the UK banking system, 
should Brown be held culpable for the credit crunch and recession that swept 
Britain in 2008 and 2009? Should he have at least anticipated these 
developments, or were the various forces driving them so complicated and 
intertwined that nobody could realistically be expected to understand the 
problems as they were unfolding? When it did strike, how well did Brown 
manage the impact of the crisis on the UK economy? If Brown and his 
colleagues are to blame for not doing more to foresee and mitigate the effects 
of the crisis, then our assessment of him should arguably be less generous than 
if he was largely a victim of circumstance. To answer this question, we need an 
account of structural change and the role of agency in this process.   
 
So far, this article has considered some of the problems involved in 
incorporating a sense of structural context into any assessment of political 
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leaders. One question requiring further discussion is that of structural change. 
The environment facing politicians will not be static. Sudden changes in the 
circumstances facing leaders may make it considerably more difficult for them 
to achieve their objectives, although if leaders themselves are partly responsible 
(through their own behaviour) for this state of affairs, then we might be minded 
to be less sympathetic in our assessment of them. The next section of this article 
turns its attention to the question of structural change. It argues that 
philosophical realism is best placed to help with this task. 
 
 
3. Philosophical Realism and Structural Change 
 
As we have seen, many social scientists have settled on the ontological 
assumption that agents and structures are mutually constituted in a dialectical 
relationship that unfolds across time and space. Agents (including political 
leaders) are reflexive, purposive beings, whose actions can reproduce and, on 
occasion, transform the society in which they live. However, society is also 
made up of structures that can constrain the interaction between individuals 
and groups. Arguably, one of the defining features of realism as a philosophical 
position is its concern with developing some methodological guidelines for 
helping us to research this apparent seamless flux.1 To cut a long story short, 
realism’s answer to this question is to analyse structures and agents as if they 
were separate, even though they are not. In this context, structure (which is 
activity-dependent in the past tense) is assumed to pre-date action, although as 
suggested, agents can then shape and alter this structural terrain. Any 
structural reform or elaboration will then post-date such strategic action. Just 
to re-state, realists accept that ontologically, structure and agency are at work 
together continuously, but this analytical ploy allows us to break into this ‘flow’ 
at various points and study it, depending on the problem at hand (Archer, 
1982).  
 
It follows then that, using realism to understand change requires us first to 
elucidate this approach’s conception of structure. Realism defines structure as 
social relations that constitute the world. Social relations refer to: ‘…sets of 
internally related objects or practices’ (Sayer, 1992: 92). These internal or 
‘necessary’ relations specify a situation where one object or practice would not 
take the form that it did unless another was related to it in the way that it was. 
For example, a tenant is not a tenant without a landlord. Internal or necessary 
relations should be distinguished from external or contingent ones. The latter 
describes a set of circumstances where one object/practice can exist without the 
                                                 
1 Realism as a philosophical tradition (as opposed to a theory of IR) is clearly a broad school. It is not 
being claimed here that our understanding of this approach can be reduced to the observations in this 
article. Rather, because we are focusing on the issue of structural change, our discussion emphasises 
the work of some authors over others. The argument below relies particularly on the work of Margaret 
Archer, Andrew Sayer and Colin Wight.  
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other, although if they become related, that combination may have significant 
social effects. For instance, human beings interact with the environment and 
that behaviour may damage the eco-structure, but such a relationship does not 
have to take place (Wight, 2006: 169-70; Joseph and Wight, 2010). Within 
structures (social relations) there will also be particular positions, associated 
with certain roles occupied by human beings (agents). It is important to 
distinguish the occupant of a position from the position itself. Human beings 
inhabiting these social roles may often change, while the roles themselves may 
persist over long periods of time.  
  
It is when realism combines this definition of structure with the associated 
concepts of ‘stratification’ and ‘emergent properties’ that we can begin to 
appreciate how it might explicate the dynamic and unpredictable context 
facing political leaders. For realists, the world is contoured or stratified. The 
interaction of various groups rests on a social and political landscape that is 
made up of a number of strata or ‘layers’. These layers (which will contain 
multiple, interacting structures) are the product of previous strategic battles 
between groups, all competing to further their interests within the structural 
environment that surrounded them. At any one time, agents (including 
political leaders) will be in contact with one or more of these layers, just as the 
layers will implicate each other. However, such stratification can lay the 
foundation for change in that contingent combinations of structures (of various 
ages and different ‘biases’) across layers may produce novel effects leading to 
tensions and contradictions and pressure for reform (Sayer, 1992, 118-21; see 
also Sayer, 2000).  
 
Realism encapsulates this idea of previously unrelated structures coalescing to 
yield novel effects through the concept of emergent properties. Such properties 
‘emerge’ from the internal relations that comprise structures but cannot be 
explained simply with reference to their origins or component parts. In other 
words, emergent properties come into existence through social combination. 
Once created, they can generate change in conjunction with other external or 
contingent relations, including agents. For example, the power of water cannot 
be explained by its core constituents (hydrogen and oxygen) because both, on 
their own, are highly flammable. However, their combination yields different 
properties (water), which can then be used by fireman (agency) to save lives. 
Of course, when it comes to examining a particular event or process, there will 
be numerous structures, combining across strata in a pattern that will be 
complex and difficult to interpret. Since, as social scientists, we can rarely 
isolate structures for the purpose of causal explanation, we always need to be 
careful not to attribute influence to the wrong ones (Sayer, 1992, 118-21; Archer, 
1995).  
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For realists then, causality and change is not a relationship between discrete 
things or events (i.e. cause and effect) as positivists’ have asserted. Nor is 
causality and change related to the amount of times such a relationship is 
observed to have occurred. Instead, causality and change is about the powers 
that objects (structures) possess. These powers may not be directly observable. 
They will also exist independent of any particular pattern of events. They will 
be activated in a process that may lead to change when a combination of objects 
come together with agents. This combination may be complex and take place 
only once – a unique moment, never to be repeated. Understanding such 
change will not be achieved by stripping down this process and reducing it to 
its component parts. It is something about the way these parts combine as a whole 
that generates the precise trajectory of change that takes place (Bhaskar, 2008).  
 
In short, philosophical realism comprehends the world as stratified or layered 
with multiple, sometimes contradictory structures. But to make this point is not 
to suggest that there is (or can be) no pattern to the world. At times, agents may 
find themselves in strategically selective environments that favour certain 
positions or preferences (Jessop, 2001: 1223). As agents (including politicians, 
investment bankers, and ordinary savers) appropriate institutions for the 
purpose of strategic action, they may activate emergent properties embedded 
within these social relations, which in turn combine with other structures and 
agents in novel ways to generate outcomes that are unanticipated and difficult 
to control. Eventually of course, these actors and structures will co-evolve over 
time and space to produce new strategically selective terrains. These may be 
biased towards different interests and groups.  
 
 
4. Philosophical Realism and the Global Financial Crisis: Making Sense 
of the Structural Dynamics Facing the Brown Leadership.  
 
How then might realism help us to make sense of the changing structural 
context facing the Brown leadership after 2007? What was the precise nature of 
this structure, including the internal (necessary) relations that comprised it? 
Perhaps the first point to note in this context was the Brown leadership was 
faced with a capitalist economy. Capitalist economies are by their very nature 
based on the profit motive and, as such, are constantly on the lookout for new 
ways to make money. At the same time, such economies can be prone to 
stagnation in that, they usually generate more wealth (savings) than they are 
able to invest. This problem of stagnation was certainly perceived to be the case 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, when the international economy experienced a 
decline in productivity rates which, in part, was related to a downturn in 
capital investment (Currie, 1983). Falling productivity had an adverse impact 
on output, growth and employment. For some writers, the 1970s represented a 
crisis for capitalism and its existing mode of accumulation.   
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As a result, the structure of capitalism (and the internal/necessary relations that 
comprised it) altered from the 1970s onwards. Some writers have labelled this 
changed the ‘financialisation’ of capitalism. To solve the accumulation 
problems noted above, the financial sector stepped in to develop a whole range 
of products (objects) allowing capitalists increasingly to make money from 
money. The financial system resembled a giant casino, where speculators 
played for bigger and bigger ‘stakes’ in an ever riskier set of ‘games’ or 
activities. A market in derivatives was created: derivatives are financial 
products whose value derives from some other asset (e.g. a bet that the price of 
a particular stock would be greater than a certain value (say £10) at a certain 
time. There was the increasingly popular practice of short-selling, where an 
investor would sell borrowed stock then buy it back at a certain time in the 
future, hopefully for a lower price (thus generating a profit). At the same time, 
the futures market (which had long been a feature of the capitalist economy) 
grew ever wider and deeper. One noteworthy feature of these products was 
that they allowed banks to hide significant amounts of losses on bad lending 
by moving it off-balance sheet. Banks were able to increase their leverage 
surreptitiously and inflate financial bubbles without politicians fully realising it 
(Landau, 2009; Lewis, 2010)   
 
Mortgage backed securities (MBS) are a financial product (object) that is central 
to our understanding of the global financial crisis and the structural change 
facing the Brown leadership, so it is worth spending a little bit more time 
describing their role. MBS were viewed at this time as a method of spreading 
the risk that large numbers of sub-prime mortgages being sold in the US would 
default. As has been widely documented, in the first half of the ‘noughties’, 
American banks pumped out large numbers of loans, often aimed at families 
with a poor credit history. The official justification for this practice was that it 
would spread the benefits of home ownership to those on lower incomes, 
especially as property prices had been rising annually since the second half of 
the 1990s. But of course, these mortgage products also helped to accumulate a 
lot of capital for banks and other financial institutions. Individuals were 
initially tempted into these loans by the offer of ‘teaser’ rates that were hiked 
up significantly after a period of time. Those that were worried about the extra 
interest they would have to pay were reassured that the value of their homes 
would go up even faster. At this time, banks were usually generous in allowing 
families to re-mortgage, as that meant extra fee income (Bellamy Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009: 27-38).   
 
How were MBS thought to be a helpful way of managing the risks of default 
on these sub-prime loans? MBS involved slicing and dicing up this debt into 
smaller chunks and packaging it together. By bundling together mortgages 
from diverse geographical regions, it was thought very unlikely that all of them 
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would experience the same problems at the same time. These mortgages were 
then combined further with top quality debt (securities) as a way of making 
them more attractive to investors (see for example, IMF 2006). This broader 
principle of ‘securitisation’ can be viewed as an emergent property, and we will 
return to its role in generating the global financial crisis (and recession in the 
UK) below. Suffice it to say that, by 2007, these MBS accounted for one third of 
the US$27 trillion bond market. By the end of 2007, US$1.3 trillion was defined 
as ‘sub-prime’ (Cable, 2009: 30).  
 
Financial speculation (and the practice of securitisation) was of course global, 
and it is important to recognise the transnational nature of this structural 
property and its particular relationship to the UK financial system. At this time, 
a number of British (and continental European) banks also attempted to boost 
their profits by adopting the same sort of strategy that could be witnessed 
across the Atlantic. One notable example in this context was Northern Rock, 
who aggressively expanded into the UK mortgage market by offering loans of 
up to five or six times the size of an annual salary. To fund this activity, 
Northern Rock relied more and more on finance from the international 
wholesale markets. By 2007, 75 per cent of Northern Rock’s funds (and 40 per 
cent of all new mortgages in the UK) were bankrolled in this way (National 
Audit Office, 2009). When these international wholesale markets seized up (as 
they did in 2007) Northern Rock and other British banks found that they had 
massively over-extended themselves.  
 
This practice (social relation) of financial speculation was necessarily related to 
another transnational practice (social relation) associated with this economic 
structure – debt acquisition. At this time, banks took on unprecedented 
amounts of debt for the purposed of speculation which, in turn, fed and 
exacerbated these debt levels. On the surface, it looked like MBS and other 
financial products had created a wider pool of capital that could be tapped for 
new investment purposes. In reality, a relatively small amount of debt was 
leveraged with larger and larger amounts of debt, much of which was not 
visible on the balance sheets of these financial institutions. For example, in the 
US at the start of the 1970s, the value of outstanding debt was one and a half 
times that of the national output; by 2005, the figure was three and a half times. 
The proportion of debt taken on by US financial institutions relative to total 
debt increased from 10% to nearly a third during the same period (Bellamy 
Foster and Magdoff, 2009: 45-48).     
 
This transnational economic structure was supported by certain external or 
contingent relations, which sustained this mode of capitalist accumulation. 
Most noteworthy in this context was the rise of the so-called BRIC (Brazil; 
Russia; India; and China) countries at this time. The rapid growth of these 
emerging economies, especially in the area of manufactured goods pushed 
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down the cost of these products in world markets. As these cheap imports 
increasingly flowed into the west, they helped those western countries 
maintain low and stable inflation in the second half of the 1990s and the first 
half of the ‘noughties’. This trend, in turn, allowed interest rates to be kept low, 
and this monetary policy underpinned the rapid expansion of credit and debt 
noted above (Cable, 2009: 88-93).  
 
But these trends (external relations) helped to support this capitalist 
accumulation strategy (based on speculation and debt) in another way as well. 
As these emerging economies became wealthier and generated more and more 
savings for investment, they became a significant source of capital inflow into 
western financial systems. In 2008, the US’s current account deficit (the mirror 
image of the net inflow of foreign capital into its economy) was estimated to be 
$700 billion; in the UK the equivalent figure was approximately $100 billion 
(Cable, 2009: 94). These capital inflows helped to support the consumption led 
growth that became such a distinctive feature of these Anglo-American 
economies at this time. By investing in government securities and other 
financial products, these BRIC countries helped to sustain the easy credit 
facilities that were available. Banks could continue to finance riskier mortgages 
because they access to these funds via the international wholesale money 
markets (see also Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).  
 
However, by the mid-2000s a contingent event impacted on this structure, 
generating a range of outcomes that were sudden and unexpected. From 2003 
to early 2006, the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates from one per cent to 
5.25 per cent. Large numbers of borrowers with sub-prime mortgages could no 
longer afford their monthly payments and defaulted.2 House prices in the US 
plummeted by 25 per cent on average from their peak in the summer of 2006 to 
the autumn of 2008 (Stiglitz, 2010: 87). That said, it is important to note (as Vince 
Cable does) that this increased mortgage default should not on its own have 
produced such a profound impact on the financial markets. The sums of money 
involved in the sub-prime losses did not justify the collapse in confidence that 
followed. Cable assumed for the sake of argument that approximately one third 
of the total US sub-prime debt eventually had to be written-off. This figure 
equates to $400 billion, only 3 per cent of the total mortgage debt. The question 
remains: how exactly can we explain the credit crunch as it developed from 
2007 onwards (see also Taylor, 2009; Greenspan, 2010)?  
 
This contingent event (rise in interest rates) combined with an emergent 
property (securitisation) in the particular set of social relations (capitalist 
                                                 
2 Another contingent event that exacerbated this trend was a significant take up of variable rate 
mortgages by the American public at this time. The chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, had actually 
encouraged this process, arguing that it was a good way for individual families to save money (Stiglitz, 
2010: 87).  
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economic structure) noted above to set off this global financial crisis. As we 
have seen, securitisation was supposed to diffuse the risk that mortgage default 
would threaten the financial system as a whole. However, precisely the 
opposite happened: by splitting up this low quality debt and dispersing it so 
widely, it became increasingly difficult to trace. In particular, securitisation 
broke the link between borrower and lender, a key component of traditional 
banking before the 1960s. Because mortgages were no longer funded by 
deposits that banks received, there was less incentive for those bankers to 
worry about default. Thorough credit assessments were skimped on, and 
typically purchasers of MBS knew much less than those who had created these 
packages of debt. By 2007, nobody knew who really owned the sub-prime 
mortgages and as a result, banks became increasingly nervous concerning the 
quality of their loan books (Davies, 2010: 133-37). As mortgage default grew 
apace in the US, panic spread out of all proportion to the actual losses that were 
being incurred.   
 
As has been widely documented, this panic led to the drying up of funding 
from the wholesale markets, as banks gradually stopped borrowing from each 
other. In February 2007, specialist US sub-prime lenders reported losses on the 
back of mortgage defaults and New Century (the second largest) filed for 
bankruptcy. In May 2007, UBS was forced to take over its in-house hedge fund 
after it ran up heavy losses. In the UK, September 2007 saw the collapse of 
Northern Rock, which was eventually taken into public ownership in February 
2008. The following month, the US government rescued Bear Stearns, before 
selling it on to JP Morgan Chase at a knock down price. In September 2008, the 
Bush Administration decided to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt, a decision 
that sent shock waves through the financial system. Bradford and Bingley 
collapsed shortly afterwards and had to be part nationalised, while Halifax-
Bank of Scotland was absorbed by Lloyds to ensure it escaped the same fate. In 
October 2008, the Brown government introduced (among other measures) a 
plan to recapitalise the British banking system, which both Lloyds-HBOS and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland tapped into directly.  
 
What initial conclusions might we draw from this account of the rapidly 
changing structural context facing the leadership of Gordon Brown? First, the 
theoretical lens of philosophical realism helps us to highlight the genuine 
complexity of this domain. Securitisation, in particular, added to the 
labyrinthine nature of these structural conditions by binding together a 
multitude of transnational social relations, processes and agents in an ever 
tighter and dense web. At the same time, securitisation also fostered the opacity 
of this structure. As noted above, MBS were consciously designed to lack 
transparency, partly to circumvent the scrutiny of regulators (not to mention 
politicians). Indeed, some commentators have noted that investment bankers 
themselves (armed with their ‘Value at Risk’ models) did not fully understand 
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the financial products they had created. Andrew Haldane’s likening of the 
system to a ‘financial cat’s cradle’ is a nice summary description of this 
environment (Haldane 2009; Davies, 2010: 102).   
 
Bearing this characterisation in mind, it seems unduly harsh to single Brown 
out for blame when it comes to diagnosing the reasons for the credit crunch as 
it enveloped Britain from 2008 onwards. Of course, the Brown leadership made 
mistakes. The tripartite structure of regulation (whereby the Treasury, Bank of 
England and Financial Services Authority shared responsibility for financial 
supervision) has been heavily criticised since the crisis broke (see for example 
HC 56-I, 2008). The FSA has since disavowed its ‘light touch’ style, while 
Alistair Darling afterwards accepted that, as Chancellor, he was too slow to 
guarantee all Northern Rock deposits (leading to a ‘run’ on this bank). 
However, because of the complicated, turbid (and transnational) properties of 
this structural terrain, no regulatory regime in the west foresaw the extent of 
this crisis, or was able to insulate its domestic economy from the adverse 
impact. Few economists or financial journalists predicted the ensuing disaster. 
Even Vince Cable could be seen in 2006 giving an address to a lunch of the 
Association of Foreign Banks praising the achievements of the City of London 
and warning of, ‘…the dangers of “the current clamour for regulation of 
financial products”’ (cited in Darling, 2011: 9). 
 
It is also worth remembering that the ‘Great Financial Crisis’ broke in 
successive waves on the UK economy and this temporality also needs to be 
borne in mind. Indeed, once the Brown leadership had rescued Northern Rock, 
the problems facing the financial system seemed to disappear (Seldon and 
Lodge, 2010: 33). In the spring of 2008, organisations such as the OECD and the 
IMF continued to forecast growth for the British economy (Peston, 2012: 12), 
whereas, Darling reports finally feeling in control of events at this time 
(Darling, 2011: 67). As it was, the ‘second wave’ of the crisis later on that year 
was triggered by an external shock that the Brown government could do 
nothing about -  the wholly unexpected decision to allow Lehman Brothers to 
collapse. Both RBS and HBOS were heavily dependent on US funds and their 
share prices plunged as a direct result of this unanticipated action.3 The UK 
Treasury was certainly aware of the deteriorating situation at both these banks 
but was powerless to stop the disaster that followed from this chain of events. 
On ‘meltdown Monday’ (6th October) the FTSE 100 experienced its biggest one-
day points fall on record: £100 billion was wiped off the share value of some 
the UK’s biggest financial institutions (Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 141-44).  
 
Finally, we noted above that the ease or difficulty of a structural context could 
partly be judged according to how commensurate it was with the objectives of 
                                                 
3 Bradford and Bingley’s shares had also fallen dramatically, but this decline had taken place steadily 
over a twelve month period.  
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the political leader under investigation. From a statecraft perspective, the 
environment sketched out above could be considered relatively demanding in 
that it undermined Brown’s strategy for achieving an image of governing 
competence on which its electoral fortunes were believed to depend (Clarke, 
Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2009).  Historically, ‘New Labour’ (under 
Brown’s stewardship at the Treasury) adopted a twin-track strategy in pursuit 
of these goals. First, they ‘depoliticised’ the conduct of monetary policy by 
separating the formulation of decisions from their implementation, and then 
hiving-off the latter to an independent Bank of England. Second, they presided 
over sustained investment in public services (especially in health and 
education) albeit constrained by a Code of Fiscal Stability containing rules 
relating to levels of government borrowing and debt. Brown’s constant refrain 
contrasting this ‘investment versus Tory cuts’ (underpinned of course by this 
broader image of financial stability) has been widely credited as one of the key 
factors behind Labour’s election victories in 2001 and 2005 (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 2001: 74-75, 240-41; Butler and Kavanagh, 2005: 57-58, 75, 182; 
Whiteley et. al. 2005). The economic recession from 2008 onwards destroyed 
this tactic, whereas exploding government deficit and debt levels gave the 
Conservatives an opportunity to pin responsibility for Britain’s deteriorating 
public finances on (yet another) profligate Labour government.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
To conclude, this article has contended that it is important to take into account 
structural context when assessing the performance of political leaders in 
different temporal and spatial moments. Using some of the theoretical 
postulates of philosophical realism, it has claimed that the governing 
environment facing the Brown leadership was more challenging than some 
commentators have suggested. If this assertion is accepted, how well did the 
Brown leadership cope? Clearly its statecraft objectives as described above 
were not achieved. Labour lost the 2010 general election and Brown led them 
to their worst result since 1983. However, in other ways, Brown’s handling of 
events, especially from the autumn of 2008 to the spring of 2009 was both bold 
and original. While a full exposition of this argument is a subject for another 
paper, the following three examples can be deployed to provide a brief 
illustration of it.  
 
First, Brown was able to demonstrate international leadership through the 
development of a bank recapitalisation plan that eventually became a template 
followed by a number of other countries.4 Three factors appear to have 
                                                 
4 The main features of this bank recapitalisation plan were a recapitalisation fund of £50 billion, of 
which £37 billion was drawn by RBS, Lloyds-TSB and HBOS and a Credit Guarantee Scheme, where 
in return for a fee, banks were given guaranteed sources of funding to encourage them to start lending 
to one another, and to the wider economy. This plan was followed up with an Asset Protection Scheme 
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contributed to this leadership role. It was Brown before most other senior 
politicians at this time who grasped the financial problems facing banks were 
as much about their capital shortfalls, as their lack of liquidity.5 Second, the 
bank recapitalisation plan that the UK authorities eventually produced 
provided a convincing solution to the question of how banks might be 
persuaded to accept the need for more capital when they were unwilling to 
admit in public (and in some cases in private) that they were sitting on 
significant losses and bad debts. The answer to this conundrum was to make 
access to government liquidity (which banks accepted they did need) 
contingent on banks raising capital to prescribed levels (Seldon and Lodge, 
2010: 164-65). Finally Brown was at pains to keep EU and US politicians 
informed of his proposals. Although Brown never convinced his counterparts 
of the merits of this bank recapitalisation plan before it was introduced in the 
UK, this consultation ensured these leaders were more predisposed to copy it 
when they came round to the idea that further action was needed (Brown, 2010: 
43-65). It was certainly the case that the financial situation in the UK only began 
to stabilise after other countries followed Brown’s lead (Thal Larsen and Parker, 
2008; Benoit, Guha and Thal Larsen, 2008; see also Wood, 2009). 
 
Brown’s leadership at this time certainly compares well when contrasted with 
his American counterparts. The US Treasury first conceived its Troubled Asset 
Relief Programme (TARP) as a response to the credit crunch. A $700 billion 
fund composed of taxpayers’ money would be made available to purchase bad 
loans held by banks that were stopping them from borrowing and lending 
money. Having purchased these ‘toxic assets’, the government would then 
attempt to value and sell them off. TARP was initially rejected by Congress 
after provoking a range of criticisms. It was unclear how the US Treasury 
would determine the price of these assets, when as noted, very few understood 
how they were put together and valued in the first place. Other commentators 
wondered exactly who would buy these assets? If banks currently holding 
them could not sell them on, why would the government necessarily be more 
successful in attracting buyers? Some suspected the government would have 
to significantly lower the price of these assets to make them more appealing, 
but if this was the case, would ailing financial institutions be able to take the 
resulting hit on their balance sheets? The Bush Administration eventually got 
a revised plan through the House and the Senate, but TARP was soon quietly 
                                                 
(February 2009) where, in return for a fee, the Treasury would insure financial institutions against 
losses incurred by holding ‘toxic’ assets. The bank of England began its Quantitative Easing 
programme in March 2009, whereby it purchased high quality assets (especially guilts) from banks to 
help improve liquidity (Thain, 2009: 443).  
5 In coming to this conclusion, Brown was helped (and listened to) Jonathan Portes, Shriti Vadera, 
Jeremy Heywood and Jon Cunliffe. This group encouraged him to research and think about the 
contrasting experiences of the Japanese and Swedish banking systems in the 1990s. Brown also read 
Ben Bernake’s essays on the Great Depression of the 1930s and this historical parallel remained 
prominent in his mind at this time (Brown, 2010: 37; Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 145)  
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dropped as the US authorities eventually followed the British lead by focusing 
on recapitalisation.  
 
Finally, Brown’s actions can also be viewed favourably when compared with 
those of the heads of government in the eurozone. In the early stages of the 
crisis, Europe’s leaders were slow to react, arguing that the problems were 
confined solely to ‘Anglo-Saxon capitalism’. The responses when they did 
come were unilateral, un-coordinated and undermined attempts at this time to 
arrive at a common position. On 30th September 2008, the Irish government 
announced without consultation its decision to guarantee, not just ordinary 
depositors money, but almost all the debts of Ireland’s five domestic banks 
(Kluth and Lynggaard, 2013). When those banks subsequently required funds 
to cover their losses, the Irish government could not reciprocate and had to turn 
to the IMF and EU for a 67.5 billion euro bailout. It was this chain of events that 
was at least partly responsible for the decimation of Fianna Fail’s electoral 
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